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CHAPTER 8 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§8.1. Fiduciary accounting: Allowance, book values. A trustee is 
required to keep and render records with respect to the administration 
of a trust. His accounts must accurately show in detail the nature and 
amount of the res as well as the mode of its administration.! Although 
statutes and court-approved forms may set forth the general framework 
of an account, it has been held that variations and additional details 
which fairly and intelligibly reflect the trustee's activity may be sanc-
tioned.2 
Fiduciary accounting practice in Massachusetts, consistent with the 
minimum broad requirements of a statute,3 may fall substantially short 
of reflecting the true value of the trust property at accounting dates. 
Original inventory values may be carried over to a series of interim ac-
counts for a period of several years without adjustments representing 
marked fluctuations in market values.4 Carrying securities at their book 
value was found to be in accordance with the traditional practice of 
the careful and prudent trustee and could not be the basis for revoking 
decrees of allowance of accounts.5 Beneficiaries lacking knowledge of 
accounting technicalities and the habitual use of book values may easily 
be misled as to the true state of the trust res as they assent to the allow-
EMIL SLIZEWSKI is a Professor of Law at the Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§8.1. ! RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §172 (1959). 
2 G.L., c. 206, §2; Ol~ Colony Trust Co. v. Rodd, 356 Mass. 584, 587-588, 
254 N.E.2d 886, 889 (1970). Hutchinson v. King, 339 Mass. 41, 44-45, 157 
N.E.2d 525, 527-528 (1959). 
3 G.L., c. 206, §2 provides: "Accounts rendered to the probate court by 
[a] . . . trustee . . . shall be for a period distinctly stated therein, and consist 
of three schedules, of which the first shal'l show the amount of personal property 
according to the inventory, or, instead thereof, the amount of the balance of the 
next prior account . . . and all income and other property received and gains 
from the sale of any property or otherwise; the second shall show payments, 
charges, losses and distributions; the third shall show the investment of the bal'ance 
of such account, if any, and changes of investment. A trustee shall state in his 
accounts the receipts of principal and income separately and also the payments 
and charges on account of such principal and income separately." 
4 NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN MASSACHU-
SETTS §435, p. 111 (4th ed. 1958); LORING, A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK §23, p. 84 
n. 5 (FaIT rev. 1962). 
5 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Mabbett, 334 Mass. 412, 135 N.E.2d 914 (1956); 
1956 Ann. Surv. of Mass. Law §2.9. 
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ance of accounts. Nonetheless, decrees of allowance based on such assents 
will not be upset.6 
Continued use of book value of trust property in renewal successive 
accounts despite a significant decrease in market value was again upheld 
with some misgivings and suggestions for future reform in Taylor u. 
Worcester County National Bank.' There, the asset held in a testamentary 
trust was commercial real estate which was appraised and inventoried 
by the executors at a value of $335,000. It was mortgaged by the execu-
tors for $200,000 in order to pay taxes and administration expenses. A 
trust company as trustee carried the property on its books at the in-
ventory value subject to the mortgage. Eleven accounts were filed and 
allowed, the remaindermen having received copies of all accounts as they 
were filed. Schedule "C" of the first eight accounts reported the difference 
between the inventory value and the principal balance of the mortgage 
as "equity" (the later accounts used the term "book value" in place of 
"equity"). Although the original book value of the trust property re-
mained the same, the successive accounts showed an increase in the 
value of the equity as .the principal on the mortgage was paid. 
A trust remainderman objected to the allowance of the trustees final 
account, petitioned to revoke prior decrees allowing the interim accounts, 
and sought to surcharge the trustee for the loss to the trust estate on 
the ground that the successive accounts "did not even remotely reflect 
the true condition of the trust estate and were a gross distortion of the 
trust equity in the 'res." Evidence was introduced showing that the 
market value of the commercial property had greatly diminished below 
the original inventory value and that the trustee had known of the 
reduction in value as the result of several appraisals made by it during 
the term of the trust. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, relying on its prior approval of the 
practice to account with book values in Old Colony Trust Co. u. 
Mabbett,8 ruled in favor of the trustee. Since the interim accounts had 
been allowed after due notice, the items appearing therein cannot be 
inpeached except for fraud or manifest error.9 Listing assets at book 
value according to traditional fiduciary practice was neither fraudulent 
nor manifestly erroneous. In Mabbett the trust assets in question con-
sisted of railroad bonds the market value of which were readily ascer-
tainable by the beneficiaries on their own initiative. The actual value of 
the commercial real estate of Taylor (like the market value of the stock 
of a closely-held corporation) could not be easily determined by a 
person who lacked expertise in appraising such property. It would be 
expected, therefore, that a beneficiary would be inclined to rely on 
6 Id. 
7 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1903, 277 N.E.2d 487. 
8 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Mabbett, 334 Mass. 412, 135 N.E.2d 914 (1956); 
1956 Ann. Surv. of Mass. Law 12.9. 
9 G.L., c. 206, 124. 
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accounting values of the trustee especially if the accounts do not make 
it clear that they are based solely on "book value." 
Trustees, in addition to their duty to account for the trust property 
clearly and accurately, owe the beneficiaries a high duty of loyalty. Their 
dealings with the cestuis are not treated as being between negotiating 
parties with conflicting interests. They must be eminently fair and com-
municate all material facts.lO In the principal case, as a result of its own 
several appraisals, the trustee knew that its book values were substantially 
in excess of market values and a fair reporting of the true status of the 
trust property might require at least a caveat that the accounting values 
might not represent those of the open market. 11 
Balanced against the duty of a trustee to make a clean and accurate 
accounting is the statutory policy expediting the efficient administration 
of estates by impressing a degree of finality to the allowance of fiduciary 
accounts. Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 206, Section 24 speci-
fically provides that decrees of allowance of accounts may not be im-
peached except for fraud or manifest error. Accounting in the usual and 
accepted manner on the form supplied by the Probate Court following 
the framework of a statute12 could not be considered to be erroneous 
although another method utilizing actual values would be more appro-
priate under the circumstances.13 
The kind of fraud needed to impeach on allowance of an account has 
been described as " 'fraud which induced the court to take jurisdiction 
which it did not have' or which deprived 'an interested party of his day 
in court.' "14 An accounting fiduciary's concealment of a material trans-
action15 or misstatement of yield of an asset16 have been found to be 
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §170 (1959). 
11 In the Taylor case the Court observed in a footnote that the trustee itself 
wisely abandoned its use of the confusing term "equity" in describing the excess 
of the book value of the l'and over the balance due on the mortgage. 1971 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1907 n.1, 277 N.E.2d at 490 n.l. 
It also said: "In recent years some corporate and other trustees have taken 
pains to point out in their accounts (by footnote or otherwise) that book values 
of trust assets have been employed, which bear no necessary relation to market 
values. Some trustees also have stated the aggregate market value, as of a specific 
date, during or following the accounting period, of securities having a readily 
ascertainable market or over-the-counter value. This, of course, without an ap-
praisal, is not easily possible with respect to land or to securities and other classes 
of property closely held or seldom sold." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1907, 277 
N.E.2d at 490. 
12 See footnote 3 supra. 
13 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Rodd, 356 Mass. 584, 587-588, 254 N.E.2d 886, 
889 (1970); LORING, A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK §23, p. 84 n.5 (Farr rev. 1962). 
14 Perry v. Perry, 339 Mass. 470, 480, 160 N.E.2d 97, 104 (1959). 
15 Jose v. Lyman, 316 Mass. 271, 55 N.E.2d 433 (1944) (failure to disclose 
self-dealing by trustee). Compare Perry v. Perry, 339 Mass. 470, 160 N.E.2d 97 
(1959) where the beneficiaries had knowledge of the dual positions of trustees 
and had the opportunity to make further inquiry in a hearing on the allowance 
of the account. 
16 Brigham v. Morgan, 185 Mass. 27, 69 N.E. 418 (1904). 
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sufficient fraud to reopen accounts. In Taylor, despite the trustee's 
cognizance of the dealing value of the commercial property, the Court 
felt that nothing had been concealed. A perusal of the accounts, more 
particularly, the last two interim accounts that were allowed, would 
give notice to the remaindermen that the trustee was using a book or 
inventory method of accounting. The remainderman's objection to the 
retention of the asset by the trustee could have been raised at a hearing 
on its propriety as an item of the account.17 
Recognizing that the probate accounting practice it was again ap-
proving might be confusing or misleading to persons not familiar with 
it, the Court went on to state: 
We cannot refrain from the observation that it would be appro-
priate for the Probate Court, after consultation with bar groups 
and organized bodies of corporate and other professional fiduciaries, 
to consider, for use in 'the future, some revisions of probate account-
ing practices, and to seek to put them into effect either by court 
rule or by proposing legislation. Such revisions may be possible 
without imposing any undue additional burden on trustees. In 
particular, there might be considered appropriate methods of re-
flecting in an account, by note or otherwise, a persistent and per-
ceptible diminution (beyond a mere temporary fluctuation) in the 
value of a trust asset. Analogous or comparable fields of accounting 
may provide helpful precedents.18 
§8.2. Fiduciary accounting's allowance: Future interests: Tax clause. 
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Bravo1 the application of a standard tax clause 
in a will was the basis of a controversy. It provided: "I direct that all 
legacy, succession, estate or other inheritance taxes imposed upon or in 
respect of any of my property shall be paid from the residue of my es-
tate."2 As with all boiler plate provisions which may be desirable for 
most situations this standard clause may fall short of attaining the specific 
objectives of a donor. 
The merit of such a provision is, of course, to pass to the general and 
specific legatees the full amounts given to them undiminished by death 
taxes which would otherwise be attributable to them.s If a substantial 
portion of the donor's wealth subject to death taxes is transferred by 
way of nonprobate transfers, the clause may prove to be inappropriate 
in that it may significantly reduce the net worth of the gift to the residuary 
17 See Perry v. Perry, 339 Mass. 470, 160 N.E.2d 97 (1959); Burlingham v. 
Worcester, 351 Mass. 198, 218 N.E.2d 123 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law 12.4. 
18 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1903, 1907-1908, 277 N.E.2d 487, 490. 
18.2. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 321, 267 N.E.2d 892. 
2 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 322, 267 N.E.2d at 892-893. 
3 See G.L., c. 65 nl, 6 and 17. 
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legatees who may have been the prime objects of the donor's beneficence.4 
Special problems may arise if the residuary bequest is designed to take 
advantage of the estate tax marital deduction.5 If the will containing 
the standard tax provision also creates future estates additional adminis-
trative complexities may develop. The amount of inheritance tax at-
tributable to a future interest does not become due until the interest 
becomes possessoryG and the amount of the anticipated tax may be highly 
speculative at the time of the formation of the residue. The taxes on 
future interests may be compromised and prepaid under a statutory pro-
cedure7 but the commissioner of taxation may decline such prepayment.8 
The executor could provide for the taxes due on future interests by 
making distribution to the residuary legatees who have present interests 
against indemnity receipts; otherwise he would have to retain a reserve 
fund out of the residue. This fund would perhaps have to equal the 
maximum possible tax which could be assessed and which in the ordinary 
case would be difficult if not impossible to ascertain. At any rate, whether 
indemnity receipts or reserve funds be utilized, the net result would be 
to deprive the residuary legatees of present enjoyment of a substantial 
part of their shares in a manner probably contrary to what would have 
been the wishes of the testator had he thought about the alternatives. 
The will in Bravo left the residue of the testator's estate in trust for 
the ·benefit of his wife for life. Upon her death, after the satisfaction of 
certain bequests, the principal was to be used to establish three new 
trusts of certain amounts and the remaining principal was to be paid 
"free of all trusts in equal shares to my residuary legatees." Article Two 
of the will designated five charities as "residuary legatees." A separate 
article contained the above-quoted standard tax clause. 
When the testator's wife died in 1933 three new trusts were created 
as required by the will, one of which was for the benefit of Hilton L. 
Bravo for life with the remainder to the contestant, Robert B. Bravo. 
The trustee filed its eighth account in 1934 showing equal distributions 
from principal to the five charities and a payment of a sum of money 
to the Commonwealth for legacy and succession taxes then due. This 
tax payment was made from funds which otherwise would have passed 
to the five charities, the "residuary legatees." The eighth account also 
showed a balance in the principal and income of the trust for the testator's 
wife, but this balance, after having been reduced by payment of various 
4 See J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1132 (3rd ed. 1961). 
5 Id. at 818; Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 
625 (1st Cir. 1965). 
6 G.L., c. 65, §7. 
7 Id. § 14. This statute by its terms seems to give only the person entitled to a 
future interest the right to prepay and compromise. Many wills specifically em-
power the executor to prepay and compromise death taxes attributable to future 
interests. 
8 See Mitton v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 229 Mass. 140, 118 N.E. 274 
(1918). 
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incidental expenses, was chosen to have been finally and equally dis-
tributed to the charities in the eleventh and final account of the wife's 
trust allowed in 1938. The charities gave indemnity receipts for all dis-
tributions to them. 
Concerning the three successor trusts, the principal of one of them 
was distributed to the remaindennan in 1936 after payment of the 
succession tax then due. The fourth and final account of that trust, 
allowed in the same year, showed that the tax was paid from its princi-
pal. No taxes were incurred when the principal of the second successor 
trust was distributed in 1943. When the third, the Hilton L. Bravo trust, 
later terminated, the trustee filed an account showing a payment from 
principal of the succession tax then due on the remainder interest. The 
remaindennan Robert B. Bravo, contested the allowance of the account 
and the Probate Court reserved and reported to the Supreme Judicial 
Court two questions: first, whether the succession tax was properly paid 
from the Hilton L. Bravo trust fund, and second, whether the adjudica-
tion and allowance of all the previous accounts should prevent the Court 
from answering the first question. 
The Court gave an affinnative answer to the second question since 
the previous accounts adjudicated and allowed9 indicated that the suc-
cession taxes, as they fell due, were paid from then available funds and 
that no reserve fund was ever created. Since there had been no "fraud 
or manifest error,"l0 a consideration of the proper source of tax payment 
on the contestant's future interest was debarred at this time. All bene-
ficiaries of the trusts, themselves or through a guardian ad litem, assented 
to all previous accounts including the important eighth account. Inas-
much as the propriety of the source of funds to pay taxes could have 
been questioned in the prior accounting proceedings, the matter is res 
judicata. 
In view of the answer to the second question the Court declined to 
answer the first question put by the probate judge. Yet, after observing 
that the tax clause was inadequate for the testamentary disposition in 
question, it expressed its agreement with the mode of payment of the 
taxes by the trustee as being "quite the only avenue it might have fol-
lowed .... Indeed, the establishment of such a reserve might well have 
given rise to various complexities much more difficult to untangle than 
that which presently confronts the trustee and us."11 A more sophisti-
cated tax clause for the testator's dispositive scheme would probably have 
expressly relieved the residue of the burden of succession taxes on future 
9 G.L., c. 206, §24. Before 1938 accounts were "detennined and adjudicated." 
For the similruity between an "adjudication" and an "allowance" under the post-
1938 version of the statute see NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY 
LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS §§288 et. seq. (4th ed. 1958). 
10 See G.L., c. 206, §24. See also Taylor v. Worcester County Nat'l Bank, 
1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1903, 1905-07, 277 N.E.2d 487, 489-90 discussed in §8.1. 
supra. 
11 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 324, 267 N.E.2d at 894. 
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interests at least to the extent that they are not compromised and pre-
paid under a power given to the executor. 
§8.3. Estates: Joint tenancy, simultaneous death. At common law, 
where two or more persons die in the same catastrophe, there is no 
presumption of law as to survivorship among them.1 If devolution of 
property depends upon proof of the order of death of the persons perish-
ing in a common disaster, the risk of nonpersuasion rests upon the one 
who claims through the survivor.2 This state of the law is unsatisfactory 
because there is often no evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to the 
time of deaths and property may pass in a manner clearly unintended 
by the deceased. The rule led to unreasonable results as, for example, 
to preclude the same legatee of two testators dying in a common disaster 
from taking under either wilI.3 
Various statutory attempts to resolve the difficulty of proof by creating 
arbitrary and complicated presumptions based upon sex, age, physical 
condition and the like proved to be unworkable.4 The Uniform Simul-
taneous Death Act approaches the problem differently. It provides a 
course for the distribution of property where there is "no sufficient evi-
dence" of the order of death of persons and creates no presumptions. 
A portion of the Massachusetts version of the uniform act provides: 
"[w]here there is no sufficient evidence that two joint tenants or tenants 
by the entirety have died otherwise than simultaneously the property so 
held shall be distributed one half as if one had survived and one half 
as if the other had survived."5 The meaning of "sufficient evidence" was 
in issue in Petition of Smith,6 where a husband and wife, who owned 
property as joint tenants and tenants by the entirety, were found dead 
in their garage, in an automobile with its engine running-death having 
resulted from carbon monoxide asphyxiation. The person claiming 
through the husband as the survivor had an expert testify that it was his 
opinion that the wife died earlier emphasizing her poor physical con-
dition and a state of depression. The only other expert testimony on the 
matter of survivorship was by the medical examiner who testified that 
it was his opinion that it was impossible to determine the precise time of 
death of each or either of them. 
After having ruled that "sufficient evidence" meant the usual standard 
in civil cases-proof by a preponderance of the evidence-the Court 
found that the claimant failed to sustain his burden of proving that the 
deaths were otherwise than simultaneous. There was no direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence as to survivorship, nor could the claimant get the 
§8.3. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2532 (3rd ed. 1940). 
2 Id. 
3 Wing v. Angrave, 8 H.L.C. 183 (1860). 
4 See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2532 (3rd ed. 1940). See also, Azvedo v. Benevolent 
Soc'y of Cal., 125 Cal. App.2d, 894, 901, 270 P.2d 948, 952 (1954). 
5 G.L., c. 190A, §3, inserted by Acts of 1941, c. 549, §1. 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 949, 282 N.E.2d 412. 
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benefit of any presumption based on sex or physical condition'? In 
earlier cases, where age, sex and physical conditions were considered to 
be relevant facts on the question of survivorship, there were additional 
circumstances of the accident from which inferences could have been 
drawn.8 
The claimant further contended that a common disaster clause in the 
husband's will changed the course of distribution set forth in the sta:tute.9 
He relied on that part of the simultaneous death act which provides: 
This chapter shall not apply to a will, living trust or deed wherein 
provision has been made for distribution different from the distribu-
tion under this chapter ... or where provision is made for a pre-
sumption as to survivorship which results in a distribution of property 
... different from that here provided,lo 
The Court rejected this argument on the ground that the common 
disaster clause in the will had no application to property owned by the 
testator as a joint tenant or a tenant by the entirety. Right of survivorship 
is an essential characteristic of both forms of co-ownership and the 
property, therefore, was not a part of the testat?r's estate.!1 
The clause by its terms did not refer to the jointly-owned property, 
but even if it had, the result would have been the same. There are 
limited circumstances in which a will may affect property settlements 
which by-pass the probate estate.12 But, the only way that the survivorship 
aspect of a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety may be defeated 
is by a severance or a termination of the estates by the owners before 
they die.13 
7 Schaefer v. Holmes, 277 Mass. 468, 470, 178 N.E. 613, 614 (1931). 
8 See Robson v. Lyford, 228 Mass. 318,117 N.E. 621 (1917). 
9 This clause provided: "In the event that my wife and I shall die under such 
circumstances as shall make it doubtful which of us died first, or if, as the result 
of a common accident my wife shan die at approximately the same time as I do, 
I direct that this, my will, shall be [construed] and shall take effect for any and 
all purposes as if my wife shall have predeceased me. The decision of my executor 
shall be final and conclusive on any question arising under this provision." 1972 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 952 fn. 4, 282 N.E.2d at 415 fn. 4. 
10 G.L., c. 190A, §5 as amended by Acts of 1961, c. 253, §2. 
11 "The husband only had the power of disposition over properties which he 
solely owned, and he had no power over property in which his wife possessed an 
interest." 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 952, 282 N.E.2d at 415. See also C. MOYNIHAN, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY C. 10, § § 3 and 6 (1962). 
12 The doctrine of equitable election may compel the surviving joint tenant to 
give up the jointly-owned property to a devisee of the property if the surviving 
tenant accepts benefits under the will. Thurlow v. Thurlow, 317 Mass. 126, 56 
N.E.2d 902 (1944). 
A will may terminate and dispose of a savings bank trust account. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §58, comment c. (1959). 
A wiU may "pour over" to an existing inter vivos ,trust. Second Bank-State 
Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960). 
13 See MOYNIHAN, supra n.ll. See also Holyoke Nat'l Bank v. Bailey, 273 Mass. 
551,556, 174 N.E. 230 (,1931). Palmer v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 222 Mass. 
263, 264-265, 110 N.E. 283, 284 (1915). 
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§8.4. Interpretation of wills: Meaning of "issue:" Adopted child. Be-
fore 1876 there was in Massachusetts no express statutory rule of con-
struction on the question whether a transfer of property to a person 
designated by the term "child" or its equivalent included an adopted 
child. The original adoption statute enacted in 1851 broadly equated the 
rights of an adopted child with a child born in lawful wedlock.1 In the 
earliest Massachusetts case on the point, the statute was interpreted to 
mean that a child adopted in 1865 by the settlor of an irrevocable trust 
should take as a "child" or "issue" of the settlor even though the trust 
was created in 1825.2 
In 1876 the Legislature restricted an adopted child's right to inherit 
property so as to allow him to inherit directly from the parent but not 
through his parent from any of his parent's kindred,3 and it created a 
new rule of construction concerning the right of an adopted child to 
take under the term "child" or its equivalent.4 The 1876 statutory rule 
was codified into General Laws, Chapter 210, Section 8 with minor 
changes in wording to provide: 
The word "child," or its equivalent, in a ... devise or bequest shall 
include a child adopted by the ... testator, unless the contrary 
appears by the terms of the instrument, but if the ... testator is not 
himself the adopting parent, the child by adoption shall not have, 
under such instrument, the rights of a child born in lawful wedlock 
to the adopting parent, unless it plainly appears to have been the 
intention of the . . . testator to include an adopted child. 
From 1876 to 1958 the statute was consistently construed to mean 
that an adopted child could not take a transfer of property as "child'',5 
as "issue", 6 or as "heir'" where the donor was a stranger to the adoption. 
§8.4. 1 "A child so adopted, as aforesaid, shall be deemed, for the purposes 
of inheritance and succession by such child ... and all other legal consequences 
and incidents of the natural relation of parents and children, the same to all 
intents and purposes as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock of such 
parents or parent by adoption, saving only that such child shall not be deemed 
capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body or bodies. • . ." 
Acts of 1851, c. 324, §6. 
2 SeweIr v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262, 276-277 (1874). 
3 "As to the inheritance of property, any person adopted in accordance with 
the provisions of this act, shall take the same share which he would have taken 
if born to said adopting parent in lawful wedlock, of any property which such 
parent could have devised by will'. In respect to inheritance also, he shall stand 
in regard to the legal descendants, but to no other of the kindred of his adopting 
parent in the same position as if born to him in lawful wedlock." Acts of 1876, 
c. 213, §8. 
4 St. 1876, c. 213, §9 which .also contained the proviso: " ... that nothing in 
this act shall be construed to restrict any right to the succession to property 
which may have vested in any person already adopted in accordance with the 
laws of this Commonwealth." 
5 See Hutchins v. Browne, 253 Mass. 55, 58-59, 147 N.E. 899, 901 (1925). 
6 See Blodgett v. Stowell, 189 Mass. 142, 144, 75 N.E. 138, 139 (1905); 
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In hannony with the modern sociological and humanitarian bias for 
equality between biological and adopted members of the same family 
and what appear to be present attitudes of donors,s the Legislature re-
velI'Sed the policy of the 1876 statute by repealing the stranger to the 
adoption rule in 1958.9 As amended, Section 8 of Chapter 210 provided: 
The word "child", or its equivalent, in a ... devise or bequest shall 
include an adopted child to the same extent as if born to the adopting 
parent or parents in lawful wedlock unless the contrary plainly ap-
pears by the tenns of the instrument. 
The 1958 Act specifically recited that it "shall be applicable only to 
... devises or bequests executed after the effective date of this act."10 
In 1962, Perkins v. New England Trust Co." confinned that the 1958 
amendment was prospective only and did not repeal the stranger to the 
adoption rule with respect to instruments executed before August 26, 
1958. 
Chapter 27 of the Acts of 196912 further clarified, liberalized and gave 
some retroactive effect to the rule of construction. Section 2 of this 
statute provides: 
The provisions of ... [G.L., c. 210, §8], as amended by section one 
of this act, shall be applicable to all . . . devises or bequests whether 
the same were executed or effective before or after the effective date 
of this act provided that said provisions shall not apply to any such 
... devise or bequest which was executed or effective prior to ... 
[August 26, 1958] with respect to any interests or right therein which 
had vested prior to the effective date of this act. 13 
Gallagher v. Sullivan, 251 Mass. 552, 554-55,146 N.E. 769 (1925); New England 
Trust Co. v. Sanger, 337 Mass. 342, 345-46, 149 N.E.2d 598, 600 (1958). 
7 See Brown v. Wright, 194 Mass. 540, 545, 80 N.E. 612, 614 (1907); Walcott 
v. Robinson, 214 Mass. 172, 176, 100 N.E. 1109, 1110 (1913); Old Colony Trust 
Co. v. Wood, 321 Mass. 519, 523-524, 74 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1947). 
8 See Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children Under Cl'ass Gifts, 50 Iowa 
L. Rev. 971, 990-996 (1965); Binavince, Adoption and the Law of Descent and 
Distribution, 51 Corn. L.Q. 152, 173-179; Estate of Sanford, 49 Cal.2d 120, 
315 P.2d 681 (1957); Estate of Heard, 49 Cal.2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957); 
In re Coe, 42 N.J. 485,201 A.2d 571 (1964); Johns v. Cobb, 402 F.2d 636 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087 (1969). 
9 Acts of 1958, c. 121. 
10 Id. §2. The act became effective on August 26, 1958, six months after its 
approval. 
11 344 Mass. 281, 182 N.E.2d 308 (1962). 
12 A new section was substituted for G.L., c. 210, §8 as amended by St. 1958, 
c. 121, §1 as follows: "Section 8. The words 'child', 'grandchild', 'issue', 'heir' or 
'heir-at-law', or their respective equivalents, in a ... devise or bequest, shall 
include one who is adopted to the same extent as if born to the adopting parent 
or parents in lawful wedlock, whether the adoption was decreed before or after 
the date of execution or the effective date of any such . . . devise or bequest, 
unless the contrary plainly appears by the terms of the instrument." 
13 Acts of 1969, c. 27, §3 made the act effective on September 1, 1969. 
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The viability of the pre-1958 rule involving a pre-1958 will was again 
a focal issue during the SURVEY year in Boston Safe Deposit and Trust 
Co. v. Fleming. 14 The testator, a resident of Massachusetts, died in 1901 
leaving a will, executed in 1899, in which he divided the residue of his 
estate into two equal portions. The first portion was to be held in trust 
to pay the income to his wife for life and upon her death the principal 
was to be added to the second portion if his daughter, Grace, was then 
living. If Grace was not then living, this portion was to be divided equally 
among six Boston charitable corporations. The second portion was to 
be held in trust to pay the income to Grace for life and upon her death 
the principal was to be paid to her "issue" then living, and if she had 
no "issue" then living the principal was to be divided equally among 
the same six charities. 
Grace, who was twenty-two years old and unmarried at testator's 
death, married in 1909, and she and her husband continuously resided 
in California from 1916 until they died. Grace and her husband adopted 
a one year old son in 1917 and in 1924 adopted a daughter, then six 
years old. They raised both adopted children in their household as their 
children. When the testator's wife died in 1938 the principal of the 
trust held for her benefit was, as required by the will, added to the 
trust held for the benefit of Grace. 
Grace died on January 5, 1969, survived by her two adopted children 
and no biological issue. A decree of the Probate Court ordering distribu-
tion of the trust principal to the six charitable corporations in equal 
shares was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court by a four to three 
majority. 15 
An earlier opinion representing the unanimous decision of a quorum 
of five members of the Supreme Judicial Court was released in April, 
1971, and later recalled and replaced by the present opinion. The with-
drawn opinion was written by Justice Braucher and in substance took 
the position of the present dissenting opinion.16 
Although it recognized the trend of recent legislative policy and public 
viewpoint to more fully equate adopted children with the natural-born,17 
the majority of the Court felt compelled to decide that the pre-1958 
rule was applicable. Since the will was executed and effective before 
August 26, 1958, the 1958 amendment by its express terms was inoperable. 
14 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 317, 279 N.E.2d 342. 
15 Justice Cutter wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Braucher wrote the 
dissent and was joined by Chief Justice Tauro and Justice Spiegel. 
16 See 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 643; see also present opinion, 1972 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 317 n.1, 279 N.E.2d at 343 n.l. 
17 For other recent Massachusetts legislative developments making adopted 
children's rights correspond more closely to those of natural-born children see 
Acts of 1962, c. 273, amending the anti-lapse statute, G.L., c. 191, §22; Acts of 
1965, c. 252, amending the intestacy law, G.L., c. 210, §7, so as to allow the 
adopted child to inherit from or through the adopting parent; Acts of 1967, c. 
463, amending G.L., c. 65, § 1, relating to tax rates and classes of beneficiaries to 
ascertain the amount of inheritance tax. 
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NQr was the 1969 Act to be applied because the trust terminated and 
the interests "had vested" prior to September 1, 1969, the effective date 
of the 1969 Act. The opinion cited a long line of cases18 applying the 
1876 rule of construction to support its conclusion and emphasized Per-
kins v. New England Trust Co.,19 with its refusal to make the post-1958 
rule retroactive, as being directly in point. 
The Court thought it to be clear that Massachusetts law and not that 
of California was determinative. The testator was domiciled in Massa-
chusetts20 and his will made no reference to the law of any other state.21 
The question to be decided was not one of the legal effect of the adoption 
under the laws of California but of the meaning of testator's Massa-
chusetts will.22 
The adopted children contended that depriving them of benefits under 
the will denied them equal protection of the laws under the authority of 
Levy v. Louisiana23 and Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability In-
surance Co.24 The Court !relegated its answer to the space of a foot-
note,25 observing that these cases did not apply to the interpretation of 
a will and the legal effect of the words used. 
The main thrust of the dissent was that the stranger to the adoption 
rule was created by the 1876 "fossil" statute, entirely out of harmony 
with the modem legislative policy expressed by the 1958 and 1969 
amendments, and should therefore be confined to the fullest extent 
possible. The opinion pointed out that it would not !reverse the many 
cases that were based on the pre-1958 laws because all of them involved 
contests between adopted children and blood relatives. Since the Fleming 
case was the first to arise in the jurisdiction dealing wi'th a contest 
between charities and adopted children, the outmoded rule should not 
apply. 
Special reliance was placed on a recent case, Moore v. Cannon.26 There, 
a pre-1958 will provided for a gift over "to those who would have been 
entitled to ... [the] estate ... had ... [the adoptive parent] died intestate 
vested with title thereto." An adopted child was allowed to take on the 
18 Many of which are cited in footnotes 5, 6 and 7 supra. 
19 344 Mass. 287, 182 N.E.2d 308 (1962). 
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§268, 269 (1971); 
see Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Weston, 342 Mass. 630, 635-636, 174 
N.E.2d 763, 767 (1961). 
21 Cf. National- Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 
(1950); Amerige v. Attorney Gen., 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949). 
22 Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 72, 80, 153 N.E. 337, 340 
(1926) . 
23 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
24 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Both Levy and Glona dealt with rights of illegitimate 
children to bring actions for wrongful death. Compare the more recent case of 
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
25 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 323 n.7, 279 N.E.2d at 346 n.7. 
26 347 Mass. 594, 199 N.E.2d 312 (1964), commented on in 1964 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §4.2. 
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ground that the rule of construction for non-inclusion of an adopted child 
was rendered inapplicable by the language of the limitation. 
The Court distinguished the cases having to do with pre-1958 trans-
fers to "heirs." The tenns of the will in M oare referred specifically to 
the estate's devolution under the intestacy law as it would have occurred 
if the adoptive parent had been vested with the title. This was not the 
equivalent of a gift to "heirs." The Court declined to extend the previous 
cases involving gifts to "heirs" to the present case since "[ n]o present 
policy (in view of the 1958 amendment of c. 210, §8 ... ) requires such 
an extension."27 
In Moore, the intent to include adopted children appeared from the 
words of the will. The dissent in Fleming discovered a similar intent in 
the dispositive scheme: that charities rather than blood relatives of the 
testator would take if the adopted children were excluded.28 
If the Fleming case is to be distinguished from all the others on this 
issue solely on the ground that the contest was between adopted children 
and charities,29 it should be on the rational basis that the average donor 
would have different desires depending upon the identity of the alternate 
takers. Assume that a testator created a residuary trust to pay the income 
to his daughter for life and upon her death to pay the principal to such 
of her issue who survive her and if no issue should survive her than to 
the C charity. It would appear that the charity was to take by way of 
an end limitation only after the testator's specific primary wishes to 
benefit his daughter and her issue have been exhausted. The will, at 
most, shows a preference for the charity over an intestate distribution. 
The dispositive scheme of the Fleming case was somewhat different. 
Under the specific tenns of the will the first portion of the residue was 
to be held for the benefit of testator's wife for life and upon her death 
the principal was to be paid to the six charitable corporations as alter-
native contingent remaindennan if Grace failed to survive the testator's 
27 347 Mass. at 599, 199 N.E.2d at 315. 
28 Under the tenns of G.L., c. 210, §8 before the 1958 amendment a child 
adopted by the testator took "unless the contrary plainly appears by the tenns 
of the instrument," but if the testator was not the adopting parent, the adopted 
child did not take "unless it plainly appears to have been the intention of the . . • 
testator to include" such child. It may be argued, on the specific wording of the 
statute, that the "tenns of the instrument" are required to rebut the final rule 
of construction and that any relevant extrinsic evidence may rebut the second 
rule. 
29 There was testimony by the adopted son, subject to exception, that Grace 
told him on many occasions of numerous statements by the testator that he had 
no direct knowledge of the charities named in the will, and that they were sug-
gested to him by the will draftsman as being reputable organizations. The judge 
also ruled inadmissable, as too remote, an offer of proof that the reports of three 
of the named charitable corporations failed to disclose the name of the testator 
as a contributor, officer or participant during his life. The dissent made no 
reference to this part of the record. 
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widow. The charities would get this portion whether or not biological 
issue of Grace survived the wife.3o 
It is difficult to see how any meaningful distinction can be made 
between an end limitation to charities and one to the donor's heirs. In 
Perkins v. New England Trust Co.31 a testator left a part of his residuary 
estate in trust for the benefit of his children and their issue. There was 
an ultimate gift over to the testator's "heirs at law" if the children were 
to die without leaving issue surviving them. The Court, finding no con-
trary intent, applied the pre-1958 rule, and gave the remainder on death 
of a child without natural children to testator's heirs instead of to the 
child's adopted child. 
Perkins also adopted a rule of construction ascertaining the "heirs" 
as of the date of the testator's death rather than the date set for distribu-
tion of the trust,32 One of the stated reasons for this canon of construc-
tion is "that such a mode of ascertaining the beneficiary implies that the 
testator has exhausted his specific wishes by previous limitations, and 
is content thereafter to let the law take its course."33 
The policy of a statute has been used to alter the fixed approach of 
the common law although the statute by its terms was to operate pro-
spectively.34 In Fleming, however, the policy of the 1958 and 1969 amend-
ments did not change the common law but changed another statutory 
rule. These recent statutes expressed the explicit policy of non-retroactivity 
except to the extent specifically set forth. The dissent would emphasize 
the broad policy to treat biological and adopted children equally and 
downgrade the express policy of non-retroactivity. The "policy" of the 
law consists of legislative as well as judicial determinations. 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Braucher, was sharply 
worded. It accused the majority of "perverse literalism" at four different 
times,35 of "linguistic demonstration"36 and "excessive devotion ... to 
their own linguistic prejudices."37 Unlike his withdrawn opinion, which 
30 The dissenting opinion made no reference to this point, but the withdrawn 
opinion considered it and dismissed it with the observation that "counsel were 
unable to suggest any rational explanation for that provision other than inad-
vertence on the part of the testator or the draftsman." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 651. 
31 344 Mass. 287, 182 N.E.2d 308 (1962). C-32 See 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.5. This rule of construction was changed by Acts of 1964, c. 307, adding G.L., c. 184, §6A, discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §4.7. 
33 Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345, 348-349, 15 N.E. 660, 662 (1888). 
~-34 See Warner v. Whitman, 353 Mass. 468, 233 N.E.2d 14 (1968), discussed in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.2. See also, Selby v. Kuhns, 345 Mass. 600, 
07, 188 N.E.2d 861, 865-866 (1963). 
35 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 328, 329, and 332, 279 N.E.2d at 349, 350, and 351. 
36 Id. at 327 n.1, 279 N.E.2d at 349 n.l. 
37 Id. at 332, 279 N.E.2d at 352. The apocryphal wise old lawyer who was 
reputed to have advised a newly-admitted member of the bar was, perhaps, later 
appointed to a court of review and gave similar advise to a neophyte judge. 
The wise old lawyer advised the young lawyer that in trying a case, if the law was 
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cited and quoted the traditional authorities in the fonn of cases, statutes 
and law review articles, Justice Braucher cited and quoted such sources 
as Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (3d ed. 1969); Puffendorf, 
Bentham and Carroll via Humpty Dumpty,38 
§8.5. Interpretation of wills and trusts: Adopted child, vested rights. 
The 1969 statute broadening the rule of construction relating to the in-
clusion of adopted children under the designation of "child" or its equiva-
lent is, by its tenns, to be given retroactive effect.1 This act, however, 
excepts from its application "any de~se or bequest ... executed or effec-
tive prior to ... [August 26, 1958] with respect to any interests or right 
therein which had vested prior to the effective date of this act."2 (Em-
phasis added). T~n::t~I1iI1.g~t "in!eEe_~ts or right thereiI! .. ~l1i~hJ];ad 
vested" is obscure. Use of the word "vest" to describe a property interest 
may imply a l~gisiative concern with vested estates, present and future, 
as defined under traditional common law tenninology used to classify 
but would include such future interests as contingent remainders and *-~ 
estates. If this were so, the statut. e .. w .. 0Uld not apply to vest.e. d. remaindero 
executory interests. It might also apply, with some doubt, to a vested E::--
remainder subject to complete or"partiaIOiVest"menT.---··_-"· 
-Classification DraTuture estate" as tr"vesteaw·oT "contingent" may be 
based largely on the fonn of the limitation creating the estate with no 
regard to the substance or value of the property interest involved. A 
gift to A for life and upon A's death remainder to B if B survives A 
creates in B a contingent remainder because it is subject to a condition 
precedent of survivorship. But, if language in the form of a divesting 
condition subsequent were substituted, the gift over to B would be classi-
fied as being vested subject to defeasance. Thus, a transfer to A for life 
with a remainder to B, but if B should die in the lifetime of A then to 
C would give B a vested remainder subject to an executory interest in 
favor of C.3 
It is obvious that the beneficial interest created in favor of B in either 
limitation is the same. It would not be reasonable to infer a legislative 
purpose to deal with B's inter~stratiOns differently, and 
on his side, he should pound the l'aw. But, if the law for his side was weak, he 
should pound the facts. And, if both the law and facts for his side were weak, 
he should pound the table. 
38 "[V]ether it's worth while goin' through so much, to learn so little, as the 
charity-boy said ven he got to the end of the alphabet, is a matter of taste," 
Dickens via Weller, DICKENS, THE PICKWICK PAPERS 373 (Inner Sanctum 
Edition-Fadimore Ed. 1949). 
§8.5. 1 G.L., c. 210, §8, amended by Acts of 1969, c. 27. See §8.4 n.12 
supra. Section 2 of the act provides that it "shall be applicable to all ... devises 
or bequests whether the same were executed or effective before or after the 
effective date of this act .... " 
2 Acts of 1969, c. 27, §2. It became effective on September 1, 1969. Id., §3. 
3 See O. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, c. 5, 
§ 170. 
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it may be significant that the proviso of the 1969 Act makes reference 
to vested "interests or right" rather than "estates." The substance and 
value of a future mteresfis not causally related to its classification under 
orthodox terminology. Indeed, a contingent remainderman may have a 
greater potential financial benefit than a vested remainderman.4 
"Vest" has at times been used by courts to designate an attribute of 
a property interest which was the subject of controversy. The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court has described a transmissible contingent 
remainder as a "vested interest in a contingent right."5 In Clarke v. Fay6 
the issue before the Court was whether a contingent remainder was 
assignable. The remainderman in question was to get a portion of the 
principal of a trust if he, as a member of a class, survived the life tenant. 
He was to receive an additional portion if he later survived his aunts 
who should die without leaving issue surviving them. The Court ruled 
that so much of the trust fund that would devolve to the remainderman 
on his survival of the life tenant was alienable by him even though it 
was_g....f~.IJ.tingent rexna~nder. It pointed Ourtnal"1netemrufioerman was 
ascertained as a person wlio must inevitably take a portion of the prin-
cipal, provided only that he was alive at the death of the life tenant. 
The remainderman's interest was said to be "more than a mere possibility, 
and was a 'vested interest in a contingent' right."7 As to the portion of 
the trust that might have devolved to the remainderman through an 
aunt, it was said to be "contingent in every respect" and amounted to 
"a mere possibility" and therefore inalienable. Unlike the first portion 
which the beneficiary would enjoy on the fulfillment of the single con-
tingency of surviving the life tenant, the augmented share through the 
aunt would become possessory only if three contingencies were fulfilled. 
The terminology of this case used to describe the transmissible beneficial 
interest is similar to the language of the proviso in the 1969 statute. 
The word "vest" may have a constitutional law connotation under 
the familiar principle that a statute may not abrogate a pre-enactment 
"vested right." To state that a vested right is protected from the operation 
of a retroactive law under the due process clause or because there would 
be an impairment of the obligation of a contract is, of course, simplistic 
and conclusory. Whether an existing right is beyond the reach of par~ 
ticular legislation depends upon several factors including the nature and 
strength of the public policy in the statutory goal, the nature of the 
right and the extent to which the statute in question would modify it.8 
4 Id. See also Young v. Tudor, 323 Mass. 508,511,83 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1948). 
5 Clarke v. Fay, 205 Mass. 228, 235-36, 91 N.E. 328, 331 (1910); Putnam v. 
Story, 132 Mass. 205 (1882); Belcher v. Burnett, 126 Mass. 230 (1879). A 
contingent remainder was "vested in right" and hence, assignable. 
6 205 Mass. 228, 91 N.E. 328 (1910). 
7 Id. at 235-36, 91 N.E. at 331. 
8 See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive 
Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696-97. See also J. SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE 
LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 8 (1953). 
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To have a statute exclude only "vested rights" from its retroactive ap-
plication may be the expression of a kg~!!'lti\T~ pu~~e!cdn.~h!.dt:...pre­
e~~ctf_;n\l?~pe~~ i~terests to the full extent permissible under the state 
an eaerru constltutions. 
~nfii.g-of ';vested rights and interests" in the 1969 Act was the 
major issue in Billings v. Fowler9 and Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. 
v. Dean.10 In Billings a testatrix, in a will executed and effective before 
1958, created a trust to terminate 21 years after the death of her last 
surviving child. The income was ,to be paid to her children (two sons 
and a daughter) and to the issue of any deceased child by right of 
representation. If any child died without leaving issue surviving him or 
her, the deceased child's share of the income was to be paid to the sur-
viving child or children and to the issue of a deceased child by right 
of representation; and if any child died leaving surviving issue and all 
such issue died before the date set for termination of the trust, the share 
of income of the deceased issue was to be paid to the surviving children 
and to the issue of a deceased child by right of representation. After the 
expiration of 21 years following the death of the last surviving child the 
trust principal was to be paid to the grandchildren of the testatrix then 
living and to the issue of a deceased grandchild by right of representa-
tion. Alive on September 1, 1969, the effective date of the statute, were 
testatrix's two sons and daughter, three children and six grandchildren 
of one son, a child of the daughter born in lawful wedlock and one 
adopted child (adopted in 1941 after testatrix's death) of the daughter. 
The Court was asked to decide whether the adopted child was a' 
beneficiary of the trust. l1 There being nothing in the will to manifest 
an intent to include adopted children and since the testatrix was not the 
adopting parent, the pre-1958 rule of construction would exclude the 
adopted child.12 The Court was, therefore, directly confronted with the 
question whether the provisions for retroactivity in the 1969 statute were 
rendered inapplicable because "interests or right therein ... had vested" 
in persons other than the adopted child before September 1, 1969. 
After observing that the proviso of the statute could not fairly be 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 379, 279 N.E.2d 906. 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 393, 279 N.E.2d 902. 
11 Testatrix's daughter (the adoptive parent) sought decaratory relief under 
G.L., c. 231A on the ground that controversy had arisen with respect to interests 
created by the will which had an important bearing upon her "immediate estate 
planning problems dependent upon whether • • • her adopted daughter is a 
beneficiary" under the wilI. 
The Court ruled that such relief could be granted although no immediate 
present interest of a present life beneficiary would be affected-G.L., c. 231A, §9 
provides that the chapter be "liberally construed" in order to "afford relief from, 
uncertainty ... with respect to rights ...• " See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Silli-
man, 352 Mass. 6, 223 N.E.2d 504 (1967); Copp v. Worcester County Nat'! 
Bank, 347 Mass. 548, 199 N.E.2d 200 (1964). 
12 See Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Fleming, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
317,279 N.E.2d 342, §8.4. supra. 
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(
viewed as adopting the technical tenninology of the classification of 
future .interests with all of its s.ubtle. an. d ... some. tim ..es p.urelY. forma. I dis-
tinctions, the Court rul!!d that at least sl?:rne_~f.!h!! _<::<>'Il!in~~Il,l<'liE..d~rs 
created by the will had vesteawithin the meaning of.!]!!;. .act, namely 
th~ interestS-oCeacli of the bIological children and grandchildren of the 
testatrix living before September 1, 1969. These interests were described 
as having "~ted iILr~ght" because they were "s.~b~~ntial" and "have 
accrued to ... [the living biological children and grandchildren], subject 
only to total or partial defeat by biological events."13 Since the rights 
of the biological issue were vested, the 1969 statute did not operate to 
include the adopted grandchild as a trust beneficiary or remainderman. 
On behalf of the adopted child it was contended that ,the objective 
of the 1969 Act was to broaden the post-1958 rule of construction and 
:es~ ~~ation of th: outmoded pre-1958 ~le to .the full e~nt 
tt...warconstituhonally posslbl~that the !'vested mterese'beyond the 
retroactive reach of the statute should lbe limited to a possessory estate 
or a presently fixed right to future enjoyment in an ascertained person. 
Special reliance was placed on a Rhode Island case, Prince v. Nugent,14 
involving a similar controversy. A 1956 Rhode Island statute expanding 
the rule of construction to include an adopted child within a limitation 
to lawful issue provided that the statute was to apply to any instrument 
whether executed before or after its enactment "unless the particular 
estate so limited shall have vested in and as to the person or persons 
entitled thereto on [May 8, 1956]."15 (Emphasis added). The Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island found that the legislative purpose was to affect 
all pre-enactment interests allowable under constitutional law. It stressed 
the nature of the statutory rule as one of construction rather than law-
. hat the donor's expressed intent would be implemented. That Court 
stated that it was of the opinion "that the legislature intended that the 
,I \ word 'vested' be given the technical meaning it has in the law of prop-
1 erty"16 and held that a remainder subject to a condition precedent of 
i survivorship was not beyond the reach of the act. 
--Billings noted the difference in the tenninology of the statutes of the 
two states: Rhode Island excepting an "estate ... [which] shall have 
vested," Massachusetts excepting "any interests or right therein which 
~~~1-.:~~~~"-th~.n~a..ge of~¥llSs_a.chusetts statute being mOre_~­
~~ 
i 
Tirrell v. Bacon,17 construing an earlier Massachusetts statute, was 
thought to be closer precedent. In the Tirrell case, the testator died in 
1857 leaving the residue of his estate in trust to pay the income to his 
wife for life and upon her death to his children in equal shares. As each 
13 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 389, 279 N.E.2d at 913. 
14 93 R.I. 149, 172 A.2d 743 (1961). 
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-7-16 (1956). 
16 93 R.I. at 162, 172 A.2d at 751. 
17 3 F. 62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1880). 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1972 [1972], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1972/iss1/11
§8.5 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 239 
child died his share of the trust fund was to be distributed to his child 
or childen then living and to the issue then living of any deceased child; 
and in default of any such child or issue to the heirs of the testator. 
One of the testator's children received his share of the trust income until 
his death in 1879 leaving an adopted child (adopted in 1874) but no 
natural children surviving him. In 1876 the General- Court enacted the 
statute creating the stranger to the adoption rule with the proviso "that 
nothing in this act shall be construed to restrict any right to the succession 
to property which may have vested in any person already adopted in 
accordance with the laws of this Commonwealth."18 
The Federal Circuit Court held that the adopted child's interest in 
the trust fund had vested within the meaning of the statute's proviso 
and was, therefore, unaffected by the new rule of construction. Having 
made the observation that the adopted child's gift was contingent upon 
his survival of his adoptive parent, the opinion nevertheless identified 
the interest as a "vested remainder, which opens to let in after-born 
children."19 But, whether the remainder was vested or contingent was 
not critical, the opinion stating: . 
The name which we may give to this interest of ... [the adopted') 
child] is not important, because, in my opinion, the proviso of the I 
statute preserved all interests. It does not say that vested remainders 
shall be preserved and contingent remainders shall be destroyed; 
the word "vested," in the proviso, qualifies "right" and not "pro-
perty" .... The "vested rights" which it preserves are all existing 
rights .... It is not to be supposed that the law intended to destroy 
all contingent remainders and executory devises, and to preserve 
vested remainders alone. Such nicety of construction is not reason 
able.2o 
Billings v. Fowler ll<ft open the question of whether the legislature 
could have retroactively affected contingent remainders"Constiiiitiorially. ~ 
It TounCIiIiifl1ierewas no desire to do so by assuming thiifone bfthe 
reasons for the inclusion of the 1969 proviso "may have been to remove 
constitutional doubts about the validity of the 1969 amendment without 
it."21 "Constitutional doubts" have arisen in a myriad of situatiQ.ns_in-
vC?!y.iI1,gili.e_~..Qdificatlon· of pre-enactment relaiionships .. W1t~ resp~~_to 1-
P!9'P'er~ Only recently was it decided locally that so tenuous an interest 
as inchoate dower could be abrogated23 despite strong earlier intimations 
18 Acts of 1876, c. 213, §9. See §8.4. supra. 
19 3 F. at 64. 
20 Id. at 65. 
21 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 389, 279 N.E.2d at 913. See also Tirrell v. Bacon, 
3 F. at 65. 
22 Many of these cases were cited by the Court. See 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
389 n.9, 279 N.E.2d at 913. n.9. 
23 Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 786, 151 N.E.2d 475 (1958). 
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that it could not.24 The beneficial interests of the living biological issue 
in Billings would appear to be more substantial than the type of interest 
which is described as being "inchoate" according to common legal 
parlance. 
In deciding that the 1969 act would not affect the interests of the 
biological children and grandchildren in existence at the date of its 
enactment, the Court seems to ignore the fine distinction of Clark v. Fay 
conceiving the number of degrees that a beneficiary may be removed 
from financial enjoyment. As in Clark, the grandchildren of the Billings 
trust would be entitled to the enjoyment of income by simply surviving 
the life tehant with the possibility of acquiring additional income later 
if further conditions were fulfilled. Nor does the Court take a stand on 
the question whether the interests of unborn natural issue would be 
affected by the statute, finding only that "vested rights" were created 
"[a]t least as to biological children and grandchildren of the testatrix, 
living prior to September 1, 1969."25 If the pre-1958 rule of construction 
were to be applied to the initial share of income only and to the interests 
of only those beneficiaries who were living prior to September 1, 1969, 
the same words-children, grandchildren and issue-would have two 
different meanings, a result the majority of the Court, in Boston Safe 
Deposit and Trust Co. v. Fleming, thought should be avoided.26 
The Dean case, decided on the same day, was much like Billings v. 
Fowler; and on the authority of Billings, the Court ruled that the in-
terests (vested and contingent) of natural born issue, who were bene-
ficiaries of a pre-1958 inter vivos trust and alive on September 1, 1969, 
".,.""Were free from the reach of the 1969 statute. Dean differed from Billings 
;'" ( in that biological i~s~e alive a~ the date of ~he enactment of. the statute 
~.~) were actually reCelVIng trust mcome, and If an adopted chIld were to 
~ be included, their share of income would have been reduced. Because 
',- of this difference, the Court felt that it was an easier case to decide. 
§8.6. Reciprocal wills: Contracts. Interrelating contracts with wills 
may cause conceptual difficulties. A contract is a bilateral transaction 
which cannot be modified unilaterally; while a will is a unilateral dona-
tive disposition which is revocable until death. Failure of some courts 
to determine the real expectation of parties to a contract to make a will 
has led to decisions which have imposed upon such contract and the 
will made in performance of it certain anomalous characteristics. 1 
24 Hanscom v. Malden and Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 7, 107 N.E. 
426, 429 (1914); Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336, 340 (1869). 
25 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 388, 279 N.E.2d at 913. 
26 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 317, 323, 279 N.E.2d at 346. 
§8.6. 1 A contract to make a will may be terminated unilaterally: Kingsbury 
v. Kingsbury, 120 Misc. 362, 366 198 N.Y.S. 512, 515 (1923); Rastetter v. 
Hoenninger, 214 N.Y. 66, 73, 108 N.E. 210, 211 (1915). A will executed in 
performance of such a contract is irrevocable. Powell v. McBlain, 222 Iowa 799, 
802,269 N.W. 883, 885 (1936); Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 607, 269 P 450. 452 
(1928). See B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 16-21, and 101-23 (1956). 
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A contract to devise property should be analyzed according to con-
tracts principles. The essence of the agreement is the transmission of 
property on the death of the promisor and the manner of doing so, by 
will, is merely incidental. If the promisor fails to devise the property 
in accord with the terms of the contract the promisee should have the 
same remedies that would be available to the promisee of a contract to 
sell land in which the death of the promisor is the date set for per-
formance. 2 A contract to make a will should not be unilaterally re-
vocable; and a will made pursuant to such contract should not become 
irrevocable. 
Bettencourt v. Bettencourt,3 decided during the SURVEY year, was 
concerned with the uncommon situation of a will purporting to set forth 
the terms of a contract which would impose legal obligations upon the 
testator to dispose of property during his lifetime. A husband and wife 
simultaneously executed reciprocal, identical wills. The wife's will, after 
an exordium provided: 
My husband, ... and I own as Jomt tenants the real estate and 
personal property described in the paragraphs below. . . . We have 
agreed with one another, in consideration of identical promises of 
each to the other, that following the death of the first of us to die 
the survivor will dispose of said jointly owned property in the 
manner stated in said paragraphs. By this will, and by an identical 
will made today by my husband, each of us confirms the agreement 
and provides for the disposition of said property and of our respec-
tive interests therein as joint tenants and as a survivor in the manner 
stated in said paragraphs; and each of us agrees to execute what-
ever deeds or other instruments may be necessary to accomplish the 
agreed results:!' 
This was followed by five paragraphs describing separate parcels of 
real estate (owned in tenancy by the entirety) and giving such property 
to the testarix's children and stepchildren.5 
2 See SPARKS, note 1 supra at 109-23. 
3 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1071, 284 N.E.2d 238. 
4 Id. at 1072-1073, 284 N.E.2d at 240. 
5 Four of the paragraphs referring to different parcels of real estate to go to 
designated children contained a final sentence like the fol1owing: "Promptly after 
the death of my husband, if I survive him, I will execute any deeds or other 
instruments necessary to convey the said property in fee to our said son .... " Id. 
at 1073 n.4, 284 N.E.2d at 240 n.4. 
The one paragraph of the will which purported to devise property at the death 
of the wife provided: "If I survive my husband, all the rea1 and personal property 
which we owned jointly, including any of the properties described . . . above 
the grantees of which shall have predeceased me, shall belong to me absolutely 
as survivor to do with as I see fit. I . . . devise ... such part of said properties 
as I may still own at the time of my death, and also all other ... property which 
I may then own . . . to our then living chiltlren, . . . the issue of any deceased 
child to take by right of representation." Id. at 1073 n.S, 284 N.E.2d at 240 n.S. 
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It appeared that the husband and wife had narrowly escaped several 
automobile accidents on a previous trip to California and that the re-
ciprocal wills in question were executed the day before they left on 
another such trip following a decision to provide for the children if they 
should die on the journey. They separated in California, returned to 
Massachusetts and the wife commenced divorce proceedings but no 
decree was ever issued. The wife revoked her will during the proceedings. 
Later, the husband died and the children brought a bill in equity to 
compel the wife to convey to them certain parcels of land according to 
the terms of the agreement she made or confirmed in her will. 
The Superior Court judge dismissed the bill. He found that the lawyer 
who drafted the will for husband and wife had told them they could 
change the wills at any time an "did not inform ... [them] that he 
intended to draw a trust, or an agreement."6 Thus he concluded that 
the instruments were wills and, as such, the wife could revoke her will 
at pleasure. 
The decree was reversed by the Supreme Judicial Court mainly for 
the reason that the lower court judge failed to directly consider the 
focal issue whether husband and wife had made or intended to make a 
contract. If so, the wife's obligations regarding disposition of the real 
estate upon the husband's death could not be extinguished by revocation 
of her will. The Court observed that the alleged contract was not one 
to make a will but one to make the inter vivos transfers set forth in the 
wills, an arrangement more clearly and easily effectuated by a carefully 
drafted trust instrument rather than a will. The reciprocal wills, how-
ever, not only made sufficient references to a contract to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Statute of Frauds7 but also purported to describe the 
specific agreement with particularity. The agreement seemed to be fair 
and natural for a wife to make with a husband with the same family 
situation and there was nothing to imply that it was subject to a condi-
tion that a harmonious marriage continue to exist.s 
Despite the manifestations of the existence of a binding contract or 
perhaps an inter vivos trust, the Court felt that the parol testimony9 
raised sufficient doubts as to the real expectation of the parties-the 
6 Id. at 1072, 284 N.E.2d at 240. This appeared as testimony of the wife 
without any exception being saved. The wife gave further testimony, also without 
exception, that she believed that she could change the will at any time and that 
the ''wil1 was made up specifically for our trip to California, with the under-
standing that I could change or do anything that I wanted to with it at any time 
if I was able to get back." The lawyer's testimony contradicted this. Id. at 1074, 
284 N.E.2d at 240-41. 
7 G.L., c. 259, §1 (contract for the sale of land). The Court felt that G.L., c. 
259, §5 (contract to make a will) was not applicable because the agreement was 
not one to make a will. 
S Although the anticipation of death while on the specific journey may have 
been the reason for the making of the reciprocal wills, the wills should not be 
treated as being conditional. See Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411 (1904). 
9 Note 6, supra. 
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references to the agreement in the wills may have reflected "an informal 
intra-family understanding subject to alteration at the will of the 
parties."10 Although the evidence was before it, the Supreme Judicial 
Court determined that it should not resolve the question since there was 
contradictory testimony involving the credibility of witnesses. It there-
fore remanded the case for a new trial so that there could be specific 
findings on all the critical issues.11 
The plaintiffs' standing to maintain the suit was also questioned. It 
was argued that they were attempting to sue on a contract as third party 
beneficiaries, a procedure prohibited by long-standing Massachusetts· 
precedent.12 In its discussion of this issue the Court made reference to 
its recently-expressed doubt as to the soundness of any general rule pre-
venting enforcement of third party beneficiary contracts.13 It also sug-
gested that the instant case might fall within a recognized exception to 
the general rule because the plaintiffs were all in an intimate family 
relationship to the promisor.14 It made a further observation that the 
action brought by the plaintiffs was in part a proceeding for declaratory 
relief under a statute which, by its terms is to be construed broadly;15 
and the plaintiffs might be entitled to a binding declaration of their 
rights under the agreement despite the lack of the availability of the 
particular relief sought.16 
At any rate, the Court stated that it didn't have to resolve the pro-
cedural problems in the case before it. One of the plaintiffs was the 
executor under the will of the husband, who, as such, was a party to 
the contract reflected in the reciprocal wills. This plaintiff, qua personal 
representative of the husband's estate, might enforce the wife's (de-
fendant's) obligation under the contract, and the Court expressed its 
desire that this plaintiff be allowed to amend the bill of complaint so 
as to become a party plaintiff in his capacity as executor. 
§8.7. New Regulation: Short statute of limitations, creditors. Mas-
sachusetts General Laws relating to the enforcement of claims of creditors 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1077, 284 N.E.2d at 242-43. 
11 The issues were stated to be "(a) whether the parties intended to make a 
binding contract; (b) the duration of any such contract (e.g. until changed by 
mutual assent, or for a reasonable time, or for the period of the then proposed 
trip); (c) the terms of any such contract, and the extent to which the two wills 
constituted an integrated expression of such a contract; and (d) whether the 
parties entered into any such contract because of some mutual mistake." 1972 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1078-1079 n.13, 284 N.E.2d at 243-44 n.13. 
12 See Saunders v. Saunders, 154 Mass. 337, 28 N.E. 270 (1891). 
13 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1079 n.14, 284 N.E.2d at 244 n.14, citing Boston 
& Maine R.R. v. Construction Mach. Corp., 346 Mass 513., 521, 194 N.E.2d 395, 
400 (1963). But see Gallagher v. First Nat'l Bank, 346 Mass. 587, 195 N.E.2d 68 
(1964). 
14 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1079, 284 N.E.2d at 244, citing Green v. Green, 
298 Mass. 19, 20-23, 9 N.E.2d 413, 414-15 (1937) and cases cited. 
15 G.L., c. 231A, §9. 
16 Citing Hannan v. Enterprise PublIshing Co., 341 Mass. 363, 365, 169 N.E.2d 
894,896 (1960). 
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of deceased persons have recently been subject to piecemeal amendments 
with a lack of concern for their effect on interrelating sections. In 1969 
the time within which an executor or administrator may not be an-
swerable to an action by a creditor was reduced from six to three months 
from the date the bond is given.1 But, the statutory protection afforded 
the personal representative in delaying the payment of debts for six 
months from the date his bond was approved remained intact.2 
In 1971 the statute of limitations barring claims of creditors of de-
ceased persons was reduced from one year to six months from the time 
of the filing of the personal representative's bond.3 Although the goal 
of ·the amendment, to expedite the administration of decedents' estates, 
was laudatory, administrative efficiency was impaired. The personal 
representative would be reluctant to pay the claims of general creditors 
within six months unless he was absolutely certain that the estate was 
solvent4 and the creditor would be forced to actually institute suit within 
the six month period in order to preserve his rights. To save creditors 
from this burden, Chapter 256 of the Acts of 19725 further amended the 
statute of limitations relating to claims against the deceased by increasing 
the period of time within which the executor or administrator may be 
sued from six months to nine months.6 
Chapter 298 of the Acts of 19727 adds one exception to the short 
statute of limitations by allowing actions for personal injuries or death 
to be commenced up to two years after such cause of action occurs; but, 
if such action is commenced more than six months after the executor or 
administrator files his bond, any judgment may be satisfied only from 
the proceeds of an insurance policy or bond and not from the general 
assets of the estate. Utilization of a six month period seems to be in-
consistent with the adoption of ,the new nine month period in Chapter 
256 of the Acts of 1972. 
§8.8. New legislation: Real estate, expense of administration. Al-
though title to real estate passes directly to the heir or devisee on the 
18.7. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 493, amending G.L., c. 197, 11. See 1969 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law 16.5. 
2 G.L., c. 197, 12 provides: "If an executor or administrator does not within 
six months after approval of his bond have notice of demands against the estate 
of the deceased sufficient to warrant him to represent such estate to be insolvent, 
he may, after the expiration of said six months, pay the debts due from the estate 
and ·shall not be personalty liable to any creditor in consequence of such payments 
made before notice of such conditions demand." 
3 Acts of 1971, c. 548, amending G.L. c. 197, 19 . 
.. Note 2, supra. 
5 Amending G.L., c. 197, 19. 
6 G.L., c. 197, §9 further provides that the ''probate court may allow creditors 
further time for bringing actions, not exceeding one year from the time of the 
giving of his official bond by such executor or administrator, provided that ap-
plication for such further time be made before the expiration of six months from 
the time of the approval of the bond." 
7 Amending G.L., c. 197, by adding §9A. 
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owner's death, the land may be sold at any time to satisfy claims against 
the decedent or his estate.1 However, where there has been a duly re-
corded conveyance or mortgage for value and in good faith by an heir 
or devisee, a Massachusetts statute gives protection to the transferee 
at the end of one year from the time that the personal representative 
files his bond.2 ,Excepted from the application of this statute are claims 
for taxes, legacies and administration expenses. Chapter 491 of the Acts 
of 19723 provides that real estate conveyed or mortgaged by a duly 
recorded instrument shall not be available for the payment of adminis-
tration expenses at the end of six years from the time that the personal 
representative gives his bond. 
§8.9. New legislation: Interest on legacies, trust distributions. In-
terest on a pecuniary legacy begins to run from the time at which the 
legacy becomes payable.1 Ordinarily, legacies are deemed to be payable 
one year from the testator's death, but if the will provides for a different 
date for payment, such date controls.2 Interest accrues from the date 
the legacy is payable even though the will may not be probated and the 
personal representative may not qualify for several years after the testa-
tor's death.3 The only statute relating to interest on legacies does no 
more than establish the rate of interest in the absence of rules that may 
be promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court.4 
This statute was amended by Chapter 448 of the Acts of 1971, which 
makes pecuniary distributions under trust instruments as well as legacies 
subject ,to the statutory rate of interest!t unless the wills and trust instru-
ments provide otherwise. The amendment also sets the time at which 
interest begins to run as being the date of the expiration of the period 
within which creditors may bring actions against an executor or adminis-
tratorS or six months from the date upon which the distribution is re-
quired by the trust department, unless the will or trust instrument provides 
otherwise. 
§8.1O. New legislation: Charitable trusts, private foundations. The 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 imposes upon trustees of "private foundations" 
new duties with stiff penalties levied upon the trusts and their managers 
if these duties are violated.1 There are very strict rules against self-
§8.8. 1 See G. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN 
MASSACHUSETTS §§1l6, 122 (4th ed. 1958). 
2 G.L., c. 202, §20. See NEWHALL, note 1 supra at §122. 
3 Amending G.L., 202 by inserting a new section, §20A. 
§8.9. 1 See G. NEWHALL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FIDUCIARY LAW IN 
MASSACHUSETTS §237 (4th ed. 1958). 
2 Id., §234. 
3 Id., §237. 
4 G.L., c. 197, §20. 
5 The rate remains the same, 4% per annum, subject to change by the Supreme 
J udidal Court. 
6 See §8.7. supra. 
§8.10. 1 See Lehrfeld, The Private Family Foundation: Causa Mortis, 12 
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 438-49 (1971). 
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dealing which may subject the foundation and its manager to a penalty 
tax.2 "Excess business holdings,"3 investments which jeopardize the 
charitable purpose,4 the making of certain "taxable expenditures"5 and 
the failure to make specified distributions each taxable year6 give rise 
to a liability for additional excise taxes.7 
Section 508 ( e) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a private 
foundation shall not be exempt from income taxation unless its governing 
instrument includes provisions which require or prohibit the above-
mentioned acts causing imposition of the additional excise taxes. Under 
a new regulation8 a private foundation's governing instrument shall be 
deemed to have been amended to meet the requirements of section 508 (e) 
if states enact corrective legislation. Such legislation was enacted by 
Chapter 367 of the Acts of 1971.9 Chapter 367 expressly refers to the 
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code which must be met in order 
to prevent the levy of additional taxes upon a private foundation and 
imposes a duty on the foundation to meet these requirements. The 
statute provides that it shall not apply to any trust to the exent that a 
court of competent jurisdiction shall determine that such application 
would be "contrary to the terms of the instrument governing such trust 
and that the same may not properly be changed to conform to . . . 
[the requirements of the statute]."10 
§8.11. New legislation: Lapsed legacies: Meaning of "relation," 
adopted children. The word "relation" in the Massachusetts anti-lapse 
statute1 has been construed to mean relation by blood.2 Recent amend-
ments have included adopted children within the designation of "child" 
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §4941. 
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, H943(c). 
4 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §4944. 
5 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §4945(d). 
6 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §4942. 
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§4943(a), 4944(a), 4945(a), 4942(a). 
8 1.50S-3(d) (adopted 12/21/72 by T.D. 7232). 
9 Adding G.L., c. 6SA. 
9 Amending G.L., by inserting c. 6SA. 
10 G.L., c. 6SA, §3. 
§S.ll. 1 G.L., c. 191, §22, which provided: "If a devise or a legacy is made 
to a child or other relation of the testator, who dies before the testator, but leaves 
issue surviving the testator, such issue shall, unless a different disposition is made 
or required by the will, take the same estate which the person whose issue they 
are would have taken if he had survived the testator. The words 'child', and 
'issue', as used in this section shall include adopted children." 
2 See Worcester Trust Co. v. Turner, 210 Mass. 115, 96 N.E. 132 (1911), 
holding that testator's sister-in-law was not a relation within the meaning of the 
statute. See also State Street Trust Co. v. White, 305 Mass. 547, 26 N.E.2d 356 
(1940) holding that testatrix's husband was not a relation. He was also a cousin 
of the testatrix, but the Court found that the testatrix made a gift to her husband 
as such, and not to him as her cousin. 
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and "issue."3 The Acts of 1971, Chapter 411 further amended the statute 
so as to provide that the words "other relation" shall also include 
adopted children. It would appear that a bequest to a child adopted 
by any blood relative of the testator would come within the scope of 
the amendment. 
§8.12. Other legislation. Section 19 of Chapter 197 of the Massa-
chusetts General Laws, authorizing a legatee to recover his legacy by 
proceedings in equity in the Probate Court, imposes no time limit within 
which such proceedings may be brought. It does, however, provide that 
real estate of the testator shall not be liable to be sold for the payment 
of a legacy as a result of such a proceeding unless the suit is filed in 
the Probate Court within twenty years from the date of the testator's 
death. Chapter 750 of the Acts of 1972 amended Section 19 by changing 
the twenty year period to six years. If the testator died within six years 
of the effective date of the act, the proceeding must be brought within 
twenty years from the date of the testator's death or December 31, 1974, 
whichever date is earlier. 
Chapter 711 of the Acts of 19721 removes the requirement of notice 
for executors or administrators of deceased depositors of special notice 
accounts. 
Chapter 291 of the Acts of 19712 lowers the age at which a person 
may make a will from twenty-one years to eighteen. 
Chapter 405 of the Acts of 19723 increases the total value of an estate, 
consisting entirely of personal property, that qualifies for informal ad-
ministration from one thousand to two thousand dollars. 
Chapter 269 of the Acts of 19724 authorizes the appointment of a 
conservator to have charge and management of the property of a per-
son declared missing in action or a prisoner of war while serving in the 
armed forces of the United States.5 
3 Acts of 1962, c. 273 and Acts of 1970, c. 462, both amending G.L., c. 191, 
122. 
§8.12. 1 Amending G.L., c. 167, by inserting §48B. 
2 Amending G.L., c. 191, §1. 
3 Amending G.L. c. 195, §I6. 
4 Amending G.L., c. 201 by adding § 16A. 
5 This amendment satisfied a need. G.L., c. 201, § 16 requires "advanced age" 
or ''mental weakness" for the appointment of a conservator. 
The "absentee" statute (G.·L., c. 200) might have a possible limited applica-
tion. It authorizes the appointment of a receiver to take possession of property 
of a person who "has disappeared or absconded" and "it is not known where he 
is." G.L., c. 200, § 1. 
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